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INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act (CWA) was created to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s
1
waters.” CWA goals were to be carried out through government-togovernment partnerships. However, like many environmental
statutes, the CWA omitted discussion of Native nations, leaving the
role of tribes under the Act unclear. This omission proved critical as
reservations faced severe pollution concerns and prompted Congress
to pass the “Treatment as States” (TAS) provision of the CWA in
2
1987. However, to be treated like a state and set their own water
quality standards (WQSs), Native nations must prove that they have a
functioning tribal government with the authority and capacity to
3
regulate.
This article examines the TAS provision and the requirements
that tribes must satisfy in order to exercise their sovereign right to
environmental regulation within the reservation. TAS status carries
with it enormous benefits or rewards, but also very real risks as tribes
face legal and legislative uncertainty and jurisdictional challenges.
Tribes considering taking the TAS step must critically evaluate their
internal capacity to do so. They must be prepared to “hold . . . [their]
4
own at the table.” This means building expertise and management
capabilities, so that their information and know-how is at least equal
5
to, if not better than, non-Indian governments. I conclude that there
are many questions that must be answered by tribes who wish to
successfully regulate clean water. Building infrastructure is not an
easy task. However, for many tribes, the challenge may be worth the
risks.

1. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE CHALLENGE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: A
PRIMER ON EPA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY 13 (1972), available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/fwpca/05.htm.
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2006). See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SURVEY OF
AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NEEDS ON RESERVATION LANDS: 1986 v–
viii (1986) (finding major deficiencies in reservation water quality, management of
solid and hazardous wastes, and treatment and disposal of wastewater).
3. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1)–(2), (4) (2009).
4. STEPHEN CORNELL ET AL., SEIZING THE FUTURE: WHY SOME NATIVE NATIONS DO
AND OTHERS DON’T 30 (The Harvard Project on American Indian Development
2005), available at http://jopna.net.
5. “[O]ut-administering, out-computing, and out-documenting non-Native
counterparts have put the winning cards in Native communities’ hands.” Id. at 31.
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II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
All too often in the past, Congress has enacted broad national legislation without specifying the role to be played by Indian tribes vis-àvis the Federal and State governments. That has led to a lot of uncertainty, confusion, and litigation and has hindered the execution
6
of important national policies on the Nation’s Indian reservations.
A. Background
Recognizing the hazards of pollution and the threat that unclean
water posed to public health and welfare, Congress enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1948 to “establish a
national policy for the prevention, control and abatement of water
7
pollution.” FWPCA became the basic legal authority for Federal
regulation of water quality; however, implementing the act proved to
8
be ineffectual, and enforcement difficult. As a result, FWPCA was
amended in 1972 to restructure and consolidate authority for water
pollution control in the Administrator of the Environmental Protec9
tion Agency. The amended FWPCA became known as the “Clean
Water Act” (CWA) and included the objective of “restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
10
nation’s waters.” CWA goals were to be carried out through federalstate partnerships, sometimes referred to as “environmental federal11
ism.” While the EPA is responsible for setting minimum WQSs for
6. COMM. ON ENV’T. & PUB. WORKS, ENV’T. & NATURAL RES. POLICY DIV. OF THE
CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
QUALITY ACT OF 1987 (PUBLIC LAW 100-4) 487 (1988) (Statement of Sen. Dan Inouye),
microformed on CIS No. 88-S322-4 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
7. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948), superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500 § 2, 88 Stat. 816
(1972).
8. See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200, 202 (1976) (stating that FWPCA problems arose from standards focused on
tolerable effects rather than preventable causes of water pollution, awkward sharing
of federal and state responsibility for promulgating standards, and cumbersome
enforcement procedures). See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2.
9. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2.
10. See id. at 13.
11. Dean B. Suagee & John P. Lowndes, Due Process and Public Participation in
Tribal Environmental Programs, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (discussing tribal
involvement in American environmental federalism, focusing on the CWA). See also
James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA’s Indian Program, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191,
198 (2006) (stating structured federal-state partnership acknowledged both national
interest in environmental management and states’ historic responsibility over public
health and welfare).
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certain pollutants that all states must meet, states are free to set
12
standards that are more stringent than the EPA requires.
However, like many environmental statutes propagated in the
1970s, the CWA omitted Native nations, leaving the role of tribes
under the act unclear. In the era of “self-determination,” invasions of
tribal sovereignty under the guise of environmental law became
13
increasingly likely as reservations faced severe pollution concerns.
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued the “American Indian
Policy,” directing federal agencies to encourage tribal selfgovernment, and the EPA became the first federal agency to adopt a
14
formal Indian policy. The policy recognized “[t]ribal governments
as the primary parties for setting standards, making environmental
policy decisions and managing programs . . . consistent with Agency
15
standards and regulations.” The policy also stated, however, that the
EPA would manage programs for reservations “[u]ntil Tribal Governments are willing and able to assume full responsibility” them16
selves.

12. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313, 1370 (2006). Federal law sets minimum water
quality criteria for certain toxic pollutants, but these are only issued as federal WQSs
if a state’s standards are inadequate. See Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s “WhackA-Mole” Game Theory in Federal Indian Law, a Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of
Environmental Law, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 90, 145 (2002) (explaining the
“whack-a-mole” game theory in federal Indian law, identifying themes and techniques
that the Court has used to reach results inconsistent with long-standing principles of
federal Indian law, and suggesting the Court’s use of these themes and techniques
have provided the Court a law-making role in Indian affairs).
13. Keith S. Porter, Good Alliances Make Good Neighbors: The Case for Tribal-StateFederal Watershed Partnerships, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 508 (2007) (discussing
environmental regulation with a focus on the Clean Water Act and the need for
coordination amongst jurisdictions); See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at v–
viii.
14. President’s Statement on American Indian Policy, PUB. PAPERS OF RONALD
REAGAN 2 (Jan. 24, 1983) (“Tribal governments, like state and local governments, are
more aware of the needs and desires of their citizens than is the Federal Government
and should, therefore, have the primary responsibility for meeting those needs.”),
available at http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/basicinfo/presidential-docs.html; U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WORKING EFFECTIVELY WITH FEDERALLY-RECOGNIZED INDIAN
TRIBES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EPA EMPLOYEES 2 (2000), available at
http://nepis.epa.gov/EPA/html/Pubs/pubtitle.htm.
15. EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS 2 (Nov. 8, 1984), available at http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/
indian-policy-84.pdf (original in all capitals).
16. Id.
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B. “Treatment as a State” Provision
[W]ithout some modification, our programs, as designed, often fail
to function adequately on Indian lands. This raises the serious
possibility that, in the absence of some special alternative response by
EPA, the environment of Indian reservations will be less effectively
protected than the environment elsewhere. Such a result is unaccept17
able.
As a first step toward complying with its new Indian policy and to
expressly open the door to tribes assuming full responsibility for clean
water standards in Indian country, the CWA was amended in 1987,
authorizing the EPA to “treat an Indian tribe as a State . . . to the
18
degree necessary to carry out the objectives of” the Act. The EPA
was authorized to treat tribes as states for certain identified purposes,
19
20
including (1) grants, (2) water quality standards, (3) nonpoint
21
source management, (4) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
22
23
System (NPDES) permits, and (5) dredge and fill permits. The
“Treatment as a State” or “TAS” provision was a “prequalification”
requirement that, once satisfied, allowed the qualifying tribe to
24
become eligible to apply for these grants and program approvals.
Decisions as to whether a tribe qualified for TAS status were made on
25
a case-by-case basis and the application process was onerous. In

17. Grijalva, supra note 11, at 228 (quoting, in part, EPA Deputy Administrator
Barbara Blum’s 1980 memorandum on Indian policy) (emphasis added).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2006). See also Grijalva, supra note 11, at 255 (2006)
(“Confusion, unpredictability, and the Agency’s failure to institutionalize the 1980
Indian Policy damaged the Agency’s credibility on Indian matters, and put pressure
on EPA to take real action implementing any future agency-wide policy.”) (footnote
omitted).
19. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1324, 1329, 1377(e)–(f) (2006).
20. Id. at § 1313.
21. Id. at § 1329.
22. Id. at § 1342.
23. Id. at § 1344.
24. Indian Tribes; Eligibility for Program Registration, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339,
64,339 (Dec. 14, 1994).
25. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal
Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United States v. Lara, 35
ENVTL. L. 471, 479 (2005) (describing application requirements as “likely to preclude
many tribes from attaining TAS status, either because the tribe lacks the resources to
devote to the lengthy application process or because the tribe cannot meet” statutory
standards); see also Indian Tribes; Eligibility for Program Registration, 59 Fed. Reg.
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1994, recognizing the TAS prequalification process as “burdensome,
time-consuming and offensive to tribes,” the EPA combined TAS
26
review into program approval applications. While this eliminated a
separate step in the process, the requirements of the TAS prequalification procedure must still be met. A tribe hoping to gain approval to
administer WQSs must satisfy all of the following statutory conditions:
27
•
The tribe must be federally recognized and must be “exercising governmental authority over a Federal Indian reserva28
tion.”
•
The tribe must have “a governing body carrying out substan29
tial governmental duties and powers.”
•
The functions exercised by the Indian tribe must pertain “to
the management and protection of water resources which
are . . . held by the Indian tribe . . . [or] held by the United
States in trust for Indians . . . [or] held by a member of the
Indian Tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of
30
the Indian reservation.”
•
The Indian tribe must be “reasonably” capable, in the “Ad31
ministrator’s judgment, of carrying out the functions.”
As a consequence, WQS approval applications must include
32
statements that the tribe is federally recognized and that describe
the form and functions of the tribal government, including the tribal
33
government’s source of authority for carrying out those functions.
The tribe must also submit a statement describing its authority to
regulate water quality, including a map or legal description of the
area over which it asserts such authority, a statement from the tribe’s
64,339, 64,340 (Dec. 14, 1994) (stating that a tribe may have jurisdiction over certain
activities but not others and that, therefore, “the Agency must make a specific
determination that a tribe has adequate jurisdictional authority and administrative
and programmatic capability before it approves each tribal program”).
26. Indian Tribes Eligibility for Program Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339
(Dec. 14, 1994).
27. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1) (2009).
28. Id. at § 131.3(l).
29. Id. at § 131.8(a)(2).
30. Id. at § 131.8(a)(3).
31. Id. at § 131.8(a)(4).
32. Id. at § 131.8(b)(1).
33. Id. at § 131.8(b)(2). The tribal governing body must demonstrate that it “is
currently carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers over a defined
area.” Id.
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legal counsel (or equivalent official) which describes the basis for the
assertion of authority, and an identification of the surface waters for
34
which the tribe proposes to establish WQSs.
The application also requires that “[a] narrative statement describing the capability of the . . . Tribe to administer an effective water
35
quality standards program” be submitted. This statement must
include a description of the “Tribe’s previous management experience;” “[a] list of existing environmental or public health programs
administered by the Tribal governing body and copies of related
Tribal laws, policies, and regulations;” “[a] description of the entity
(or entities) which exercise the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions of the Tribal government;” and “[a] description of the
technical and administrative capabilities of the staff to administer and
manage an effective water quality standards program, or a plan which
proposes how the tribe will acquire additional administrative and
36
technical expertise.” The plan must also address how the tribe will
“obtain the funds to acquire the administrative and technical
37
expertise.”
Within thirty days of receipt, the “substance and basis of the
Tribe’s assertion of authority to regulate the quality of reservation
waters” is made available for notice and comment to “all appropriate
38
governmental entities.”
If a conflicting or competing claim of
jurisdiction is received, the Regional Administrator has the final
decision as to whether or not “the Tribe has adequately demonstrated
39
that it meets the requirements” of the applications. However, the
Agency “retain[s] authority to limit its approval of a tribal application
40
to those land areas where the tribe has demonstrated jurisdiction.”
34. Id. at § 131.8(b)(3).
35. Id. at § 131.8(b)(4).
36. Id. at § 131.8(b)(4)(i)–(v).
37. Id. at § 131.8(b)(4)(v). The regional administrator may also require
additional documentation that he/she judges to be “necessary to support [the tribe’s]
application.” Id. at § 131.8(b)(5).
38. Id. at § 131.8(c)(2)(i)–(ii).
39. Id. at § 131.8(c)(4). The functions exercised by the Indian tribe must
pertain “to the management and protection of water resources which are” held by an
Indian tribe, “held by the United States in trust for Indians,” “held by a member of an
Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or
otherwise within the borders of the Indian reservation.” Id. at § 131.8(a)(3).
40. Indian Tribes; Eligibility for Program Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339,
64,340 (Dec. 14, 1994) (stating also that a tribe may have jurisdiction over certain
activities but not others; therefore, the Agency must make a specific determination
that a tribe has adequate jurisdictional authority, as well as administrative and
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C. Devolution, Delegation, or Something Else Entirely?
Assuming a tribal government can meet [TAS] criteria, when the
EPA acts to turn over regulation of these environmental resources to
the tribe, is it “devolving” this power to the tribe or merely “delegating” such authority? This . . . returns us to the question of whether
41
tribes are inherent sovereigns or merely federal instrumentalities.
The scope of tribal authority over lands and resources has been
debated, defined, and defended since the time of first contact with
Europeans, and tribal authority under the CWA is no exception.
David Wilkins, in his article The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The
Federal Government as Shape-Shifter, suggests that “devolution” refers to a
program or issue being returned or “devolved” to tribes who held
original power over it, while “delegation,” by contrast, indicates that
tribes are “without any independent authority over the subject matter
42
and are acting as . . . instrumentalities of the federal government.”
Throughout history, tribes’ inherent sovereign powers of jurisdiction
over reservation lands, as well as over tribal members and nonmember Indians, has generally been accepted, but authority over non43
Indians and non-Indian land is often challenged.
Joining the debate, scholars cannot seem to agree as to the
source of tribal authority to set and enforce WQSs. While some argue
that the TAS provision recognizes inherent tribal sovereignty over all
44
waters within reservation boundaries, others contend that the CWA
45
delegated federal authority to tribes to exercise this power. Still
programmatic capability, before it approves each tribal program).
41. David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The Federal Government as
Shape-Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 231 (2001) (emphasis added) (discussing
the treatment of tribes as states).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (holding no
civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian activity on non-Indian lands within
reservation unless non-Indian entered into consensual relationship with tribe or
activity “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding no tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants).
44. See Jessica Owley, Tribal Sovereignty Over Water Quality, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 61, 62 (2004) (arguing that the TAS provision “exists to clarify tribal jurisdiction,
not to create it”); Suagee, supra note 12, at 146.
45. See James M. Grijalva, Tribal Governmental Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of
Reservation Waters, 71 N.D. L. REV. 433, 444 (1995) (“The most potent source of tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians is federally-delegated power.”); Keith S. Porter, Good
Alliances Make Good Neighbors: The Case for Tribal-State-Federal Watershed Partnerships, 16
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others conclude that the CWA both devolves jurisdiction and is a
46
delegation of power to tribes to regulate WQSs. In Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Supreme
Court cited the CWA as an example of Congress expressly granting
47
authority for environmental regulation to tribes; however, the EPA
took a different view.
Responding to comments that the CWA was not intended to expand the scope of tribal authority over non-Indians on the reservation, the EPA examined the Act’s legislative history and found it to be
“ambiguous and inconclusive” in regards to the scope of tribal
48
authority. Stating that it did not find that the statute “expands or
limits . . . authority beyond that inherent in the Tribe,” the EPA
decided that the CWA was not a delegation of federal authority but
rather “recognize[s] inherent Tribal civil regulatory authority to the
49
full extent permitted under Federal Indian law.”
Adding to the ambiguity of tribal authority to set WSQ, however,
the EPA also stated, “in light of the legislative history . . . the question
of whether [the TAS provision] is an explicit delegation of authority
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 515 (2007) (“[CWA] confers upon tribes a degree of
sovereignty in preserving any culturally or historically significant use of the
reservation waters.”); Regina Cutler, Note, To Clear the Muddy Waters: Tribal Regulatory
Authority Under Section 518 of the Clean Water Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 721, 741 (1999) (arguing
that, under Chevron analysis, the plain meaning of the CWA, when read in context of
legislative history, “indicates a clear congressional intent to delegate regulatory
jurisdiction . . . to qualified tribes”).
46. See Owley, supra note 44, at 101 (“A plain reading of the [CWA] shows both
an acknowledgement of already existing tribal sovereignty and an unambiguous
delegation of federal authority to tribes.”); Judith V. Royster, Oil and Water in the
Indian Country, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 457, 466 (1997) (stating that tribes generally
have inherent authority to regulate waters in Indian country and should also, if they
choose, be authorized by EPA to operate federal programs). But cf. Darren J. Ranco,
Models of Tribal Environmental Regulation: In Pursuit of a Culturally Relevant Form of
Tribal Sovereignty, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 46, 48 (“TAS status . . . appears to
augment the authority of tribes but, in fact, diminishes tribal sovereignty.”).
47. 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989).
48. Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
49. Id. See also Tweedy, supra note 25, at 478 (stating EPA’s presumption appears
“consistent with Congressional intent, as manifested in the language of the CWA”).
But cf. Dean B. Suagee, Indian Tribes and the Clean Water Act, A.B.A. TRENDS, Jan.-Feb.
2005, at 4, 5 (arguing that express delegation of federal authority to tribes would help
“fill the gap in the regulatory program of the CWA that results from the lack of EPAapproved WQS” in Indian country because tribes could adopt WQSs “without
worrying about lawsuits challenging their authority”).
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50

over non-Indians is not resolved.” The Agency:
[P]resumes that, in general, Tribes are likely to possess the
authority to regulate activities affecting water quality on the
reservation . . . [but it] does not believe . . . that it would be
appropriate to recognize Tribal authority and approve
[TAS] requests [without] verifying documentation . . . [and]
51
an affirmative demonstration of their regulatory authority.
In essence, under the TAS provision, tribes have authority to set
WQSs only if they already have the authority to do so.
D. The Bane of Jurisdiction
Tribal jurisdiction is politically controversial, legally multifaceted,
and defined in case law whose continually evolving principles are
52
rife with ambiguity.
As often happens when tribes dare to regulate, disputes over jurisdiction with non-Indians, particularly with state governments,
inevitably occur. “Jurisdictional battles make environmental regulation in Indian country difficult [because] no sovereign —federal,
53
state, or tribal—wants to relinquish any of its authority.” The EPA
has complicated matters by stating that tribes are the “primary parties
for setting standards, making environmental policy decisions and
54
managing programs for reservations,” while also stating that it will
authorize environmental program management to the government—
state or tribal—that can demonstrate adequate jurisdiction through55
out the reservation. U.S. Supreme Court decisions make it even
harder for Native nations to determine whether tribal authority to
50. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
51. Id.
52. David F. Coursen, EPA’s New Tribal Strategy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10,643, 10,647 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (discussing tribal jurisdiction).
53. Marren Sanders, Ecosystem Co-Management Agreements: A Study of Nation
Building or a Lesson on Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty?, 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 114 (2008)
(examining tribal sovereignty and resource management in the era of environmental
self-determination via the Cornell/Kalt model of “nation building” in Indian
country).
54. EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN
RESERVATIONS, supra note 15, at 2.
55. Memorandum from the Adm’r of U.S. EPA, Federal, Tribal, and State Roles
in the Prot. and Regulation of Reservation Env’ts (July 10, 1991) (on file with
author).
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regulate will be upheld. A number of cases have steadily eroded this
authority, particularly in regards to tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
56
lands located within reservation boundaries.
57
In Montana v. United States, the Court held that the Apsáalooke
Nation (Crow Tribe) may regulate non-Indian activity on non-Indian
lands within the reservation only if the non-Indian entered a consen58
sual relationship with the tribe or its members, or the activity
“threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
59
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Also, in
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, a no-majority opinion held that county
zoning authority controlled non-Indian fee land in the “open” area of
the Yakima reservation, but tribal zoning laws governed non-Indian
60
fee land in the “closed” area.
Tribal WQS programs seem to be spared at least some of this
jurisdictional confusion. While the EPA holds that it “retain[s]
authority to limit its approval of a tribal application to those land
61
areas where the tribe has demonstrated jurisdiction,” the agency has
also expressly stated that water management is absolutely crucial to
the survival of many Indian reservations and that a “checkerboard”
system of regulation, such as that endorsed by the Brendale opinion,
“would ignore the difficulties of assuring compliance with water
quality standards when two different sovereign entities are establish62
ing [the] standards.”
In addition, lending strong support for the proposition that tribal
WQS programs satisfy the second Montana exception, the EPA
recognizes that “water quality management serves the purpose of
protecting public health and safety, which is a core governmental

56. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 565. For example, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements. Id.
59. Id. at 566.
60. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408, 432, 444 (1989).
61. Indian Tribes; Eligibility for Program Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339,
64,340 (Dec. 14, 1994).
62. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). See also Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear, Note, The Flathead Water
Quality Standards Dispute: Legal Bases for Tribal Regulatory Authority over Non-Indian
Reservation Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 213 (1996) (stating that to properly
regulate the quality of water that flows through their lands, tribes must be able to
regulate what enters their reservations from beyond those areas).
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function, whose exercise is critical to self-government.” In response
to Brendale, the EPA adds that “[b]y contrast, the power to zone can
be exercised to achieve purposes which have little or no direct nexus
64
to public health and safety.”
To date, no dispute regarding tribally regulated WQSs has
reached the Supreme Court; however, a number of cases have
reached circuit courts of appeal. City of Albuquerque v. Browner was the
65
first case challenging WQSs set by a tribe under the TAS provision.
The City of Albuquerque’s waste treatment facility discharged into the
66
Rio Grande River upstream of the Isleta Pueblo. Albuquerque filed
suit when the EPA tried to revise the city’s NPDES permit to meet the
Pueblo’s WQS, which were more stringent than federal and New
67
Mexico standards. The court upheld the EPA’s reading of the CWA
as recognition of inherent tribal regulatory authority, concluding that
the Pueblo could “establish [WQSs] that are more stringent than
those imposed by the federal government . . . because it is in accord
68
with powers inherent in Indian tribal sovereignty.” The court also
held that the EPA could require upstream NPDES dischargers, such as
69
Albuquerque, to comply with downstream tribal standards.
In Montana v. EPA, the State of Montana challenged the EPA’s
grant of TAS status to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
which allowed the tribes to establish WQSs for the Flathead Indian
70
Reservation. Several non-tribal facilities owned by the state, county,
and municipalities engaged in regulated discharges pursuant to
existing NPDES permits on non-Indian fee land within the reserva71
tion. The court upheld the EPA’s approval of the tribes’ TAS status
based on the second Montana exception and determined that the EPA
was correct in finding that the “activities of the non-members posed
such serious and substantial threats to Tribal health and welfare that
72
Tribal regulation was essential.”
It concluded that the EPA’s
granting of TAS authority was “valid [and] reflect[ed] appropriate
63. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,879 (Dec. 12, 1991).
64. Id.
65. 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965 (1997).
66. 97 F.3d at 419.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 423.
69. Id. at 424.
70. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921 (1998).
71. 137 F.3d at 1139.
72. Id. at 1141.
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delineation and application of inherent Tribal regulatory authority
73
over non-consenting non-members.”
The most recent circuit decision involving the EPA’s approval of
74
a tribe for TAS status is Wisconsin v. EPA.
There, the state of
Wisconsin argued that, under the Equal Footing Doctrine, it held title
to certain submerged lands within the Mole Lake Reservation, and
was therefore the proper sovereign to regulate WQSs for those water
75
bodies. Noting that the Equal Footing Doctrine “cannot be accepted
as limiting the broad powers of the United States to regulate navigable
76
waters under the Commerce Clause,” the court held that that the
EPA’s grant of TAS status to the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians was “not arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary to
77
law.” Consistent with the purposes of the CWA and the principles of
Montana’s second exception, “the Band ha[d] demonstrated that its
78
water resources were essential to its survival.” Therefore, “it was
reasonable for the EPA . . . to allow the [Band] to regulate water
quality on the reservation, even though that power [included] some
79
authority over off-reservation activities.”
E. The Wisconsin Debacle
Congressional specialists have limited vision. They work their own
committees and police their specialized turfs happily oblivious to the
outside world. Their intense ideologies find comfort in steering clear
of complicated matters that promise only unwelcome entangle80
ments.
The Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin became one of the first tribes
granted TAS under the CWA, and in 1996 the EPA approved the
81
During the discovery phase of Wisconsin v. EPA,
tribe’s WQS.
73. Id.
74. 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1121 (2002).
75. 266 F.3d at 746.
76. Id. at 747 (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963)).
77. Id. at 750.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The Penobscot
Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 816 (2004) (discussing the 1976
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act which Rodgers argues wrongfully defined
tribes as municipalities).
81. Jennifer Hill-Kelley, Restoring the Reservation, Sustaining Oneida, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 21, 21 (2007) (discussing the success of the Oneida Environmental, Health, and Safety Division).
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evidence came to light that EPA officials falsified and backdated
documents supporting the Oneida, Menominee, and Lac du Flam82
Once exposed, the Oneida and Lac du
beau TAS approvals.
Flambeau TAS approvals were rescinded and two EPA officials were
83
indicted by a federal grand jury.
Eventually, the lawsuits were
dismissed and the EPA was ordered to pay the state $369,000 in
84
attorney’s fees and court costs.
It comes as no surprise that, in 1998, one year after cancelling
Oneida and Lac du Flambeau TAS status, the EPA revised its strategy
for TAS approvals. Among other goals, the EPA aimed to “improve . . . legal defensibility of [their] decisions regarding tribal
85
programs” and adopted a recommendation that “appropriate
governmental entities” be given the opportunity to comment on a
tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee land in its
86
initial TAS application. According to David Coursen, this policy not
only makes the TAS process more time-consuming but also “effectively
gives [state governments] two opportunities to comment on tribal
87
jurisdiction.” As a result, tribal governments applying for TAS status
may be exposed to challenges that risk their sovereign ability to
protect their lands and natural resources as well as their relationship
with the federal government.

82. Bonner R. Cohen, EPA Official Pleads Guilty in Fraud Case, ENV’T & CLIMATE
NEWS, Sept. 1, 2000, available at http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/9665/
EPA_official_pleads_guilty_in_fraud_case.html. These challenges to TAS approval
were consolidated into the Wisconsin v. EPA case when it was first filed. Paul M.
Drucker, Wisconsin v. EPA: Tribal Empowerment and State Powerlessness Under § 518(E) of
the Clean Water Act, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 323, 379 n.342 (2002) (reviewing
Wisconsin v. EPA and discussing its repercussions for nationwide water pollution
regulation). The case proceeded regarding only the Mole Lake Band’s application as
the investigation revealed that it was not affected by the allegations. Id.
83. Indianz.com, EPA Attorney Pleads Guilty, http://www.indianz.com/News/
show.asp?ID=lead/6282000 (last visited December 29, 2009). The Menominee
voluntarily withdrew their “Treatment as a State” (TAS) application and Marc Radell,
the Associate Regional Counsel of the EPA, pleaded guilty to contempt of court.
Cohen, supra note 82. Claudia Johnson, Region V Tribal Coordinator and Program
Manager, passed away from cancer before the disposition of the case against her. Id.
84. Indianz.com, supra note 83.
85. Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator, U.S. EPA &
Jonathan Cannon, General Counsel, U.S. EPA to EPA Administrators 3 (Mar. 19,
1998) (on file with author).
86. Id.
87. Coursen, supra note 52, at 10,646.
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III. MORE RISK THAN REWARD?
No state that brings a lawsuit runs serious risk that a court might
hold that the state does not exist, that its territory is but a fraction of
that imagined[,] . . . . [t]hat its founding documents are a fraud,
that its chairman was not properly chosen, or that its lawmakers are
common miscreants made readily answerable for their errors. Tribes,
88
by contrast, are exposed to these risks all the time.
Alex Tallchief Skibine writes that TAS status “allows Indian tribes
to extend the reach of their sovereignty beyond the reservation
89
borders.” Unfortunately, of the 562 federally recognized tribes in
the United States, only 45 have been granted TAS status to date, with
90
only 34 gaining approval for their WQS. Scholars vary as to the
reasons for these disappointing numbers. One of the realities that
tribes must consider is the text of the TAS provision itself. First and
foremost, the tribe must be “federally recognized,” and the WQS
program must concern the management and protection of water
91
resources defined by land location and ownership. Both of these
92
requirements automatically exclude many tribes from qualifying.
Additionally, the history of federal, tribal, and state relations is replete
with conflict. Tribes opting to enact their own WQSs are often

88. Rodgers, supra note 80, at 823.
89. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the Reservation Borders,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1022 (2008) (arguing that Indian tribes venturing
beyond the reservation should still be vested with at least some attributes of
sovereignty).
90. See U.S. EPA, Indian Tribal Approvals for the Water Quality Standards
Program, http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/tribes/approvtable.htm (last visited Nov.
5, 2009). The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation requested that the
EPA promulgate federal WQSs for the reservation. Water Quality Standards for the
Colville Indian Reservation in the state of Washington, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,622, 28,622
(July 26, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
91. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1) (2009). WQSs must pertain to water resources within
the borders of an Indian reservation and be 1) held by the Indian Tribe; 2) held by
the United States in trust for Indians; 3) held by a member of the Indian Tribe if such
property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation; or 4) otherwise within
the borders of the Indian reservation. Id. at § 131.8(a)(3).
92. See James M. Grijalva, Where Are the Tribal Water Quality Standards and TMDLs?,
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 63, 67 (2003) (holding because only 1 of 229 tribes in
Alaska has a reservation, number of tribes potentially eligible for TAS under the CWA
is severely diminished ). See also Tweedy, supra note 25, at 480 (stating tribes should
not be denied TAS status because they lack a treaty or other federal documentation
demonstrating their sovereign authority).
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93

confronted with expensive time-consuming litigation.
Cases like Montana v. EPA uphold tribal sovereignty to set WQSs,
but only to the extent that its authority to do so is recognized by, and
94
its minimum standards comply with, the EPA. Non-Indians are
particularly sensitive to environmental regulation and often see it as
95
an intrusion on state authority. For example, when the Penobscot
and Passamaquoddy tribes requested stricter levels for dioxin in
regards to NPDES permits issued to pulp mills whose discharges
affected the tribe’s aboriginal rivers and fisheries, the mills responded
by requesting an “information raid” designed to obtain the “entire
documentary story pertaining to Maine tribes and natural re96
97
sources.” Winning the right to litigate in state court, the mills
demanded to inspect documents pursuant to the Maine Freedom of
98
Access Act. The mills sought materials related to the tribes’ alleged
authority to regulate water resources within or adjacent to Indian
territory, its efforts to obtain TAS status, and its efforts to have the
99
EPA adopt WQSs different from state standards.
The tribes moved to dismiss based on the Maine Indian Claims
Settlement Act, which states that “internal tribal matters” were not

93. See Ranco, supra note 46, at 46 (holding a tribal program resembling federal
or state WQSs is more likely survive litigation, but the more the program reflects
tribal values, the greater the risk to tribal sovereignty). See also Denise D. Fort, State
and Tribal Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act: A Case Study, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 771, 772 (1995) (stating TAS provision increases the potential ten-fold
for tribal and state jurisdictional conflicts).
94. See Ranco, supra note 46, at 48 (stating that circuit court cases can be viewed
as an example of federal efforts to limit tribal sovereignty and prevent tribes from
making meaningful authoritative decisions).
95. See e.g., Grijalva, supra note 11, at 199–200 (stating that the “EPA’s existence
was a constant reminder of the public’s lack of confidence in state governments’
ability and willingness to protect human health and the environment. . . . Suddenly,
with little warning, and certainly without consultation states found themselves bound
to respect (and implement) federal mandates in a subject area they formerly
governed with little outside interference.”); see also Grijalva, supra note 92, at 68
(holding state officials see any exercise of tribal or federal power within state borders
as an infringement on state expectation of complete sovereignty).
96. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 80, at 837.
97. Id. Under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” the federal court dismissed the
case as it was based on a state “freedom of access” lawsuit, whose defense was that it
would intrude upon federally protected tribal sovereignty. Penobscot Nation v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 81, 82–83 (D. Me. 2000).
98. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401–452 (Supp. 2009).
99. Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Indian Nation, No. CIV.A. CV-00-329, 2000
WL 33675350, at *1 (D. Me. Sept. 19, 2000).
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100

subject to regulation by the state.
The court concluded that the
record production would not interfere with internal tribal matters
because “[a]ny efforts by the Tribes to regulate water resources,
obtain ‘treatment as a State’ status, or adopt water standards different
from those of Maine would impair Maine’s interest in pollution
101
control.” The tribes did not have TAS status, but “the very fear of it
was reason enough to approve this corporate raid on tribal docu102
ments.” As William Rogers states, “[The] [r]efusal of the federal
courts to protect [these tribes] underscores why ‘treatment as state’ in
the federal environmental laws requires a further battery of legal
103
protection.”
A. Here Today, Gone Tomorrow?
Legal protection for tribal sovereignty has waxed and waned
throughout the history of federal-tribal relations. During the 1970s, at
the same time as the creation of the EPA and the CWA amendments,
the era of “self-determination” was being promoted by Congress and
104
the Executive. The Supreme Court, however, began to systematically limit tribal sovereignty, including the right of tribal governments to
105
regulate non-Indians within the reservation. While Albuquerque v.
Browner, Montana v. EPA, and Wisconsin v. EPA uphold tribal sovereignty to regulate, tribes must keep in mind that the mechanism for
doing so was predicated on current federal Indian law and the EPA’s

100. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 6206(1) (Supp. 2009).
101. Great N. Paper, 2000 WL 33675350, at *4.
102. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 80, at 842.
103. Id. at 844. See also Drucker, supra note 82, at 376 (stating “a whole new saga
in the storied water battles of the West may find a stage in [a TAS provision] of the
CWA”).
104. See President’s Message to Congress Transmitting Recommendations for
Indian Policy, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363 (1970). President Nixon officially ended the
Termination Era and urged Congress to adopt legislation providing for greater tribal
autonomy and control of their people, lands, and resources. Id. His recommendations led to the new “self-determination” policy and passage of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which provided, for the first
time, that tribal programs, while funded by the federal government, could be planned
and administered by the tribes themselves. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a–450n (2006).
105. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (holding that
there was no civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian activity on non-Indian lands
within a reservation unless the non-Indian entered into a consensual relationship with
tribe or the activity “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”).
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106

approval of tribal authority and WQSs.
For example, Anna Fleder and Darren Ranco argue that TAS
status “appears to augment the authority of tribes but in fact diminishes tribal sovereignty . . . [by] maintain[ing] that [tribes] must fix
WQSs as a state, rather than as a nation, in accordance with federal
107
laws.” Other scholars agree that “the threat of a ‘civil-Oliphant’—a
flat rule prohibiting any tribal civil regulation of non-Indians in
108
Indian country—is very real.” The EPA continues to reaffirm its
commitment to “build a strong partnership with tribal governments to
109
protect human health and the environment in Indian country.”
However, tribes must balance the desire to promulgate standards
based on cultural and traditional needs and decision making with the
realities of potentially changing federal policy and regulation.
B. Federal “Core” Standards
Beware of Congressional gifts to Indian tribes.

110

Living up to the federal government’s reputation for changing
106. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. E.P.A., 211 F.3d 1280, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(“EPA’s interpretation of the [CWA] never has been subject to judicial review on the
question of the presence or absence of an express delegation to tribes to regulate fee
lands within the bounds of reservations.”). See also Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich
Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 934–35 (2000) (stating EPA fundamentally undermines
tribal environmental self-determination by expressly incorporating the Montana
exception and Brendale’s “serious and substantial” impact into basis for tribal
regulation). Cf. Drucker, supra note 82, at 379–80 (noting that grant of TAS status by
EPA is virtually guaranteed, because “the Agency’s institutional predisposition is to
encourage tribal applications for TAS status and, once received, make sure they are
approved”).
107. Anna Fleder & Darren J. Ranco, Tribal Environmental Sovereignty: Culturally
Appropriate Protection or Paternalism?, 19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35, 44–45
(2004) (noting that the Isleta Pueblo obtained permission to adopt standards under a
clean water law it did not devise and could not change, that the standards were
subject to review by a federal agency, and that only the agency could enforce
standards).
108. Grijalva, supra note 92, at 68. See also Ranco, supra note 46, at 48 (arguing
tribal-EPA relationship “rests on two rather dangerous assumptions: that agencies will
always decide in favor of tribes . . . and that reviewing courts will always defer to
agencies’ decisions”). But see Drucker, supra note 82, at 388 (concluding Wisconsin v.
EPA decision makes state opposition to granting of TAS status and tribal WQSs
futile).
109. Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Adm’r (July 22, 2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/reaffirmation-memo-epa-indian-policy-7-2209.pdf.
110. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 80, at 817.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss2/7

18

Sanders: Clean Water in Indian Country: The Risks (and Rewards) of Being T
5. Sanders.docx

2010]

1/18/2010 9:14 PM

CLEAN WATER IN INDIAN COUNTRY

551

Indian policy, in 2001, the EPA proposed a new rule to implement
111
“core” federal WQSs in Indian country. Though withdrawn a few
days later, so that the new administrator could review it, another
round of consultation regarding core federal WQSs was proposed in
112
2004. Significantly, the EPA stated that, although its preference is
that tribes develop and adopt their own WQSs, the agency nonetheless “does not expect that the proportion of Tribes seeking EPA
approval of water quality standards under the Clear Water Act will
113
increase significantly in the near future.”
The proposed core
standards would apply to tribes that have not established approved
WQSs and to those that have not opted out by affirmatively proving
that they have a plan, or intend to develop a plan, for establishing
114
WQSs “within a reasonable amount of time.”
For some tribes, imposition of core standards by the EPA may be
the best choice, but for others the proposal is an affront to sovereign115
ty. Recognizing this possibility, the Haudenosaunee Environmental
116
Task Force found the proposal well-meaning but paternalistic.
Absent traditional knowledge and law, the one-size-fits-all standards
111.

“Indian country,” as used in Chapter 18 of the United States Code, is defined

as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
112. See Interim Draft Outreach and Consultation Plan: Federal Water Quality Standards
for Waters in Indian Country 2 (Jan. 29, 2004) (on file with author).
113. Federal Water Quality Standards for Indian Country; Proposed Rule 4 (Jan. 18,
2001) (unofficial pre-publication copy of the proposed rule), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/tribes/filesproposedcore2001.pdf.
114. Id.
115. For example, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation requested
that the EPA promulgate federal WQSs for their reservation. Water, Quality
Standards for the Colville Indian Reservation in the State of Washington, 54 Fed. Reg.
28,622, 28,622 (July 6, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
116. Haudenosaunee Environmental Task Force Response, Core Water Quality
Standards for Indian Country Waters Without EPA-Approved Tribal Standards (on file with
author) (finding “opt-out” approach disrespectful and an intrusion on sovereignty).
But see Suagee, supra note 12, at 149 (arguing tribes should support core proposal
because ongoing lack of approved WQSs on reservations is invitation for states to
assert their WQSs).
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would “fail to protect [Native nations’] unique concerns and cultural
117
needs [and] further promote assimilation” by the dominant society.
The proposed core standards rule has never been published but
118
remains on the books. It may only be a matter of time before it is
enacted or some other form of legislation gives tribes no other choice
regarding clean water on the reservation.
C. The Oklahoma Rider
[The] revival of water pollution law in Indian country is not universally admired. In fact, it is frequently resented. Each and every
tribal delegation runs into stiff opposition—invariably from an
offended state, often from polluters who have prospered in the sha119
dows of the status quo.
Giving tribes no other choice is exactly what happened when the
Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma gained TAS status and WQS program
120
approval in 2004. Not surprisingly, a lawsuit was filed by the state
challenging the EPA’s decision, and Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe,
Chairman of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee,
requested an investigation into the handling of TAS applications in
121
the state. What came as a surprise, not only to the tribe but also to
the EPA and the Governor of Oklahoma, was a midnight rider
attached to a transportation bill after the House and Senate had
122
agreed on the bill’s final version.
117. Haudenosaunee Environmental Task Force Response, supra note 116. But see
Kathleen A. Kannler, Note, The Struggle Among the States, the Federal Government, and
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes to Establish Water Quality Standards for Waters Located on
Reservations, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 53, 64 (2002) (arguing it is in tribes’ best
interests to have federal government specify WQSs because many do not have
resources to develop their own individual programs).
118. See Proposed Rule 4, supra note 113.
119. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 80, at 820 (emphasis added).
120. See Letter from Richard E. Greene, Reg’l Adm’r. to George Elton Howell,
President, Pawnee Nation of Okla. (Nov. 3, 2004), available at http://epa.gov/
region6/water/ecopro/watershd/standard/pawnee-approval_decision.pdf. The EPA
approved the Pawnee application only insofar as it pertained to tribal trust lands. Id.
TAS status was not approved for member allotments and other lands because the
Nation had not demonstrated “adequate authority for CWA program authorization”
over those areas. Id.
121. Indianz.com, EPA Case on Tribal Sovereignty Attracts Attention,
http://www.indianz.com/News/2005/008611.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2009).
122. Anthony Thornton, Indian Leaders Hear Complaints About Legislation, THE
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 2, 2005, at 11A (statement of Chad Smith, principal chief of the
Cherokee Nation: “The only people who knew about [the amendment] were Senator
Inhofe and the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association.”).
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Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Trans123
Tucked away in subtitle B “Other
portation Equity Act of 2005.
Miscellaneous Provisions” is a short paragraph essentially stating that
if Oklahoma gains approval to run state environmental programs, the
EPA, on request of the state, must approve administration of the state
program in Indian country located within the state “without any
124
further demonstration of [state] authority.” The act also provides
that the EPA may treat an Oklahoma tribe as a state only if, in
addition to satisfying federal TAS requirements, the tribe and the
state enter into a cooperative agreement. Oklahoma must agree to
“treatment of the Indian tribe as a State and to jointly plan administer
125
program requirements.”
As the legal battle over the Pawnee Nation’s TAS status ended,
126
non-Indian sentiment for the amendment was generally favorable.
The rider was viewed by the tribes as “the most scary, direct, take-thegloves-off-and-go-for-the-jugular attack on tribal sovereignty” ever
127
seen.
In making the decision to pursue a WQS program, tribal
governments must balance the reality of opposition, such as that
exemplified by the Oklahoma rider, with the certainty of benefits that
may be gained with TAS status.
IV. REWARDS
[N]o activity on the reservation has more potential for significantly
affecting the economic and political integrity and the health and
welfare of all reservation citizens than water use, quality, and regu128
lation.
Clean water is essential to many tribes, not just as a source of sustenance, but also for cultural, medicinal, and spiritual reasons. For

123. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
124. Id. § 10211(a) at 119 Stat. 1937.
125. Id. § 10211(b)(2) at 119 Stat. 1937.
126. See Editorial, Reasonable, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 11, 2005, at A12, available at
2005 WLNR 24859949 (stating tribally-developed standards for environmental
matters would have led to unneeded layers of bureaucracy). See also Editorial, Filling
the Bill: Inhofe’s Sage Rider Targets Tribes, THE OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 11, 2005, at 6A,
available at 2005 WLNR 24823033 (comparing Inhofe’s tactics to sausage making;
“unsavory, but the results could be quite tasty”).
127. Thornton, supra note 122 (statement of Lee Price, attorney for the Pawnee
Nation).
128. Jana L. Walker & Susan M. Williams, Indian Reserved Water Rights, NAT.
RESOURCES L. MANUAL 433, 437 (Richard J. Fink ed., 1995).
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example, the Hualapai use ponderosa pine needles and water from
the San Francisco Peaks to aid women in childbirth, and pure spring
water is used in Havasupai sweat lodges as part of their religious
129
practices.
The EPA requires that, at a minimum, WQSs include
designated water uses, in-stream criteria to protect these uses, and an
130
Certainly, the most obvious benefits or
anti-degradation policy.
rewards for tribes gaining TAS status and WQS program approval is
their ability to maintain some measure of local control over water
quality on the reservation and to include standards that reflect
131
traditional, cultural, and ceremonial needs.
Other advantages for tribes with TAS status include the prospect
of developing their own NPDES permit systems and receiving funding
132
directly from the federal government. In addition, tribal WQSs can
reduce the “checkerboard” environmental jurisdictional pattern
within reservations and strengthen federal-tribal government-togovernment relationships, allowing tribes a greater opportunity to
133
influence federal environmental regulatory policy and processes.
Tribal standards can not only directly regulate pollution within the
reservation, but also give tribes rights against upstream discharges that
may affect water quality within reservation borders.
For example, a tribe with federally approved WQSs can challenge
and sometimes “veto” the issuance of federal permits. All applicants
129. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
130. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
131. For example, the Isleta Pueblo included “Primary Contact Ceremonial Use”
as a designated use of the Rio Grande River within the boundaries of the reservation.
City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428 (10th Cir. 1996). See also Grijalva,
supra note 45, 462–63 (stating tribal WQSs give tribes federally-enforceable regulatory
power to prohibit non-Indian activities on fee lands that risk unacceptable degree of
harm to tribal water quality).
132. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2007).
133. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (stating checkerboard system of regulation, where tribe
and state split up regulation of water quality on reservation, ignores difficulties of two
different sovereign entities establishing standards for same stream segments). See also
Montana v. U.S. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding EPA regulations
granting TAS authority are valid as reflecting appropriate delineation and application
of inherent tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting non-members); Sanders,
supra note 53, at 110 (stating environmental co-management can strengthen
government-to-government relationships by increasing cultural understanding
between parties, thereby increasing possibility of finding effective solutions to interjurisdictional environmental issues and reducing risk of litigation).
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for permits that involve an activity that may result in a discharge into
navigable waters must provide certification that the discharge will
134
comply with CWA requirements, including tribal WQSs. As part of
certification, the EPA must notify a downstream tribe with approved
WQSs of any proposed discharge that may affect the tribe’s water
quality, and the tribe may impose terms or conditions to ensure that
135
the discharge complies with tribal standards. Any terms or conditions imposed become a condition of the permit, enforceable by
136
federal law. If the tribe denies certification, the federal agency may
137
not issue the license or permit.
New or revised state-issued WQSs must also comply with tribal
standards. If the state standards do not support downstream tribal
requirements, the EPA may reject the proposed state program and
138
promulgate federal standards. In addition, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERLA), the EPA must clean up hazardous waste sites to a degree
sufficient to achieve all applicable or relevant and appropriate
139
pollution standards, including federally approved tribal WQSs.
Clearly, there are many rewards or benefits for tribes that gain TAS
status. However, not all tribes can, will, or want to do so. The next
section examines some of the internal questions tribes who wish to
exercise their sovereign right to regulate WQSs must consider.
V. WHAT CAN TRIBES DO?
Even in law, doing nothing can have a limited life span if emergent
140
circumstances require a response.
When we talk today about sovereignty and self-determination, we
mean that Indians must first decide for themselves how they wish to

134. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2007). See also Indian Tribes; Eligibility for
Program Authorization, 59 Fed.Reg. 64,339, 64,342 (Dec. 14, 1994).
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2), (b), (d) (2007).
136. Id. at § 1341(d). See also City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 422
(10th Cir. 1996) (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 106 (1992) (“EPA’s
requirement that NPDES dischargers must comply with downstream States’ water
quality standards was a reasonable exercise of the agency’s statutory discretion
pursuant to [the CWA].”)). Accord Am. Rivers, Inc. v. F.E.R.C., 129 F.3d 99, 102 (2d
Cir. 1997) (holding Federal Power Act requires incorporation of all state-imposed
CWA certification requirements into federal hydropower license or relicense).
137. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2007).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(b) (2009); Id. at § 1313(c)(3).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 9626(a) (2007); 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A) (2007).
140. Rodgers, Jr., supra note 80, at 817.
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use the earth, and then they will carry on the dialogue with the non141
Indian world . . . .
The ability of tribes to control pollution and protect water quality
is vital to the survival of Native nations. As discussed in the previous
section, clean water is vital to tribes, not only on cultural, medicinal,
and ceremonial bases, but it is also an important element of sove142
reignty. One issue tribes wishing to adopt WQSs must consider is
that, while tribes should have complete authority to codify and
enforce their WQSs as “domestic dependent nations,” they may do so
143
only to the extent allowed under federal law. Therefore, tribes that
develop independent WQSs for their reservations must meet federal
144
minimum requirements under the CWA. As with the Colville tribes,
a tribe may request that the EPA “promulgate Federal water quality
145
standards for waters on Indian Lands.”
Other options for tribes are to adopt the standards of the state
within which they reside, or to enter a cooperative agreement with the
146
state under which state standards apply to Indian country. These
options have advantages, not the least of which is the potential of
reducing jurisdictional disputes and the risk of litigation. However,
while state WQSs must also meet federal minimum requirements,
these standards may not be adequate to protect the quality necessary
147
for tribal uses.
Environmental self-regulation is critical to tribal
sovereignty, but as tribes consider whether to take primary responsibility for WQSs on the reservation, they must also take a hard look at
their capacity to do so.

141. Statement of Indian U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Hallet,
quoted in Grijalva, supra note 11, at 224.
142. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 418 (10th Cir. 1996).
143. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 (1831); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1151
(1948), superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 88 Stat. 816 (1972).
144. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (describing federal water quality
standards and methods by which to implement them); Id. at § 1370 (preserving state
authority to regulate pollutants).
145. Water Quality Standards for the Colville Indian Reservation in the state of
Washington, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,622, 28,622 (July 6, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131).
146. See generally, Grijalva, supra note 92 (discussing issues surrounding the
implementation of the Clean Water Act by tribes).
147. Id. at 69 (arguing that state run regulatory programs in Indian country likely
substitute state values for those of the tribe, striking at the core of tribal selfgovernment and contravening congressional intent that tribes play primarily a
regulatory role).
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A. Institutional Capacity
Treating the tribe as a state does not make it so.

148

What really matters are not only [tribal government] rights and
powers but the ability to put those rights and powers to work in effec149
tive, productive ways.
The TAS provision of the CWA requires a functioning tribal gov150
ernment with authority and capacity to create effective WQSs. As
part of the application process, tribes must submit detailed, descriptive documentation demonstrating jurisdiction over the area they wish
to manage, as well as their technical and administrative qualifications
151
and experience. Not only can these requirements be offensive to
148. Rogers, Jr., supra note 80, at 820.
149. Stephen Cornell, Five Myths, Three Partial Truths, A Robust Finding, and
Two Tasks, Address Before the Native American/Alaskan Native Economic
Development Conference 14
(Apr. 19, 1994) (transcript available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/pub_131.htm).
150. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1)–(4) (2009).
151. Specifically, the application must include the following:
(1) A statement that the Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior.
(2) A descriptive statement demonstrating that the Tribal governing body is
currently carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers over
a defined area. The statement should:
(i) Describe the form of the Tribal government;
(ii) Describe the types of governmental functions currently performed
by the Tribal governing body such as, but not limited to, the exercise of police powers affecting (or relating to) the health, safety,
and welfare of the affected population, taxation, and the exercise
of the power of eminent domain; and
(iii) Identify the source of the Tribal government’s authority to carry
out the governmental functions currently being performed.
(3) A descriptive statement of the Indian Tribe’s authority to regulate water
quality. The statement should include:
(i) A map or legal description of the area over which the Indian Tribe
asserts authority to regulate surface water quality;
(ii) A statement by the Tribe’s legal counsel (or equivalent official)
which describes the basis for the Tribes assertion of authority and
which may include a copy of documents such as Tribal constitutions, by-laws, charters, executive orders, codes, ordinances, and/or
resolutions which support the Tribe’s assertion of authority; and
(iii) An identification of the surface waters for which the Tribe proposes
to establish water quality standards.
(4) A narrative statement describing the capability of the Indian Tribe to
administer an effective water quality standards program. The narrative
statement should include:
(i) A description of the Indian Tribe’s previous management experience which may include, the administration of programs and services authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Education
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Native nations, they also, depending on their regulatory infrastruc152
However, officials at the
ture, can be downright overwhelming.
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development at
Harvard University (Harvard Project) and the Native Nations Institute
for Leadership, Management, and Policy at the University of Arizona
(NNI) believe that Native nations that reclaim power over their own
153
affairs can dramatically improve community welfare. By rebuilding
the institutional capacity historically subjugated by federal law and
policy, tribal governments can reduce dependence on the federal
154
government and strengthen tribal sovereignty.
Stephen Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt argue that federal Indian
policy has created dependency among Native nations, such that tribes
Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450 et seq.), the Indian Mineral Development Act (25 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.), or the Indian Sanitation Facility Construction Activity Act (42 U.S.C. 2004a);
(ii) A list of existing environmental or public health programs administered by the Tribal governing body and copies of related Tribal
laws, policies, and regulations;
(iii) A description of the entity (or entities) which exercise the executive, legislative, and judicial functions of the Tribal government;
(iv) A description of the existing, or proposed, agency of the Indian
Tribe which will assume primary responsibility for establishing, reviewing, implementing and revising water quality standards;
(v) A description of the technical and administrative capabilities of the
staff to administer and manage an effective water quality standards
program or a plan which proposes how the Tribe will acquire additional administrative and technical expertise. The plan must address how the Tribe will obtain the funds to acquire the
administrative and technical expertise; and
(5) Additional documentation required by the Regional Administrator
which, in the judgment of the Regional Administrator, is necessary to
support a Tribal application.
40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b) (2009).
152. See Haudenosaunee Environmental Task Force Response, Core Water Quality
Standards for Indian Country Waters Without EPA-Approved Tribal Standards, (2001) (on
file with author) (stating tribal tenets, doctrines, and treaties already contain
provisions covering designated uses of water bodies, narrative water quality criteria,
and anti-degradation policies). Cf. Grijalva, supra note 92, at 67 (“Many tribes have
no established environmental agency, administrative procedure laws, formal court
systems, or other complementary governmental functions.”); Maria E. Hohn,
Determining Water Quality Standards on Tribal Reservations: A Cooperative Approach to
Addressing Water Quality Under the Clean Water Act, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 293, 309
(2008) (concluding that “tribes are not well equipped to address water quality issues
on their own”).
153. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 187,
193 (1998), reprinted at http://jopna.net/pubs/jopna_2003-03_Sovereignty.pdf
(noting the link between institutional capacity and economic development).
154. Id. at 191.
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have had to rely on “someone else’s institutions, someone else’s rules,
155
[and] someone else’s models, to get things done.” For instance, for
many years the Lummi Indian Nation depended on the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) to administer its water-related services, a situation
156
that proved inadequate as water quality continued to degrade.
Under a tribal enabling ordinance in the Nation’s Code of Laws, the
Lummi Tribal Sewer and Water District was established providing
critical water and sewer infrastructure and services to all reservation
157
residents, both Indian and non-Indian.
Harvard Project and NNI research has revealed that effective
governing institutions in Indian country share certain characteris158
tics. These include stable institutions and policies, fair and effective
dispute resolution, separation of politics from business management,
a competent bureaucracy, cultural match or legitimacy, and strategic
159
orientation.
1.

Stable Institutions and Policies

Stable institutions and policies include formal and informal but
established practices that dictate how a tribe relates to its members
and to outsiders, how rights and powers are distributed, and the rules
160
For instance, in 1982, the
by which all of the above operate.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation
155. Id. at 195–96 (1998). See also Jane Marx et al., Tribal Jurisdiction Over
Reservation Water Quality and Quantity, 43 S.D. L. REV. 315, 322, 316 (1998) (“regulation of reservation water quantity and quality is central to tribal self-government and
cannot and should not be entrusted to others”).
156. The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Honoring
Nations: 2002 Honoree, Lummi Tribal Sewer and Water District, available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/hn/hn2002cleanwater.htm.
157. Id.
158. STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, RELOADING THE DICE: IMPROVING THE
CHANCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 15 (Joint
Occasional Papers on Native Affairs 2003), available at http://jopna.net/pubs/
jopna_2003-02_Dice.pdf.
159. See Sanders, supra note 53, at 129–31. Cultural match refers to governing
institutions matching community views about how authority should be organized and
exercised; otherwise tribal government can lack legitimacy with the people it is
supposed to govern. Id. Cornell and Kalt define strategic orientation as the ability of
a tribe to change its thinking from reactive to proactive, from short-term crisis
management to long-term sustainable solutions. STEPHEN CORNELL AND JOSEPH P.
KALT, TWO APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON AMERICAN INDIAN
RESERVATIONS: ONE WORKS, THE OTHER DOESN’T 16 (Joint Occasional Papers on
Native Affairs 2006), available at http://jopna.net/pubs/jopna_2005-02_Approaches
.pdf.
160. CORNELL & KALT, supra note 158, at 17.
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created its Natural Resources Department to maintain the integrity of
161
their streams and the high quality of Flathead Lake. The department employs approximately 135 staff and, in 1988, established the
Division of Environmental Protection to oversee WQSs, shoreline
protection, air quality, solid and hazardous waste, non-point source,
162
and wetlands programs.
Flathead environmental activities include education and outreach programs, restorations projects, joint efforts with shoreline
landowners, and partnering with the state of Montana to address
163
nutrient enrichment in the lake.
Formal policies can include
164
constitutions, codes, and procedures. Informal practices are usually
determined by the specific tribe’s cultural standards of what is right,
165
what is wrong, and how things should be done.
2.

Dispute Resolution and Separation of Politics

A fair and effective dispute resolution is often reflected by a
166
strong and independent tribal judicial system.
Tribal governing
institutions must show that claims and disputes, including disputes
with the tribe itself, will be fairly dealt with and that they have an
167
effective and responsive dispute resolution system.
In addition,
Harvard Project research has shown that when business decisions are
made according to political agendas or pressures, tribal businesses
typically either fail or become a drain on tribal resources, preventing
168
those resources from being used to their full advantage.
3.

A Capable Bureaucracy

According to Cornell and Kalt, one of the key elements for institutional success is management that gets the job done and done
169
well. In the 1950s, during the Termination period of federal Indian
policy, the Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians was “both terminated
161. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-823-R-06-007, CASE STUDIES IN
TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS PROGRAMS: CONFEDERATED SALISH & KOOTENAI
TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/tribes/files/flathead.pdf.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. CORNELL & KALT, supra note 158, at 17.
165. Id.
166. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 153, at 197.
167. Id.
168. See CORNELL & KALT, supra note 158, at 33.
169. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 153, at 201.
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by the U.S. government and . . . dispossessed [of their lands] when
the Army Corp of Engineers flooded its original reservation to create
170
Lake Mendocino.” Decades later, after restoring their tribal rights
and securing eighty acres of land for their current reservation, the
Band formed the Coyote Valley Tribal EPA, a “youth-focused tribal
program that enables [the Band and the regional EPA office] to
171
partner in addressing water quality issues on the reservation.”
The program “educates Pomo youth in environmental monitor172
ing skills and provides summer and after-school jobs.” By learning
to respect and protect the environment, the Band’s youth are
“increas[ing] confidence in their own abilities to act as citizens of a
sovereign Indian nation” and “investing in their own futures and in
173
the future of the Tribe.” A capable bureaucracy can enable a tribe
to assert control over natural resources and other areas that affect
174
them.
4.

Cultural Match or Legitimacy

Harvard Project research revealed that tribal governing institutions were more productive and effective when they fit with the tribe’s
175
cultural norms and understandings. When cultural match is high,
these institutions are more likely to be respected and supported by
176
the people they govern. When cultural match is low, the institutions
are often viewed as “toothless [and are] ignored, disrespected, and/or
177
turned into vehicles for personal enrichment.” Cultural legitimacy
can be seen in a number of tribal environmental programs.
For example, the Mole Lake Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of
the Sokaogon Chippewa Community has designed uses that include
“all Tribal Waters for cultural, subsistence, spiritual, medicinal,
ceremonial, and aesthetic purposes . . . ecologically associated with
170. The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Honoring
Nations: 2002 Honoree, Coyote Valley Tribal EPA, available at http://www.hks.harvard
.edu/hpaied/hn/hn_2002_epa.htm.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 153, at 201. The need for a capable bureaucracy is
evidenced not only for TAS applications. For example, when a tribe receives a state
or federal request for certification regarding proposal discharges that might affect
reservation waters, the failure to act on the request within a one year constitutes a
waiver of certification. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).
175. Cornell, supra note 149, at 4.
176. Cornell & Kalt, supra note 153, at 202.
177. Id.
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178

Tribal Waters.”
Also, for the last decade the Oneida Tribe of
Wisconsin has been reacquiring traditional land, taking unsuitable
farmland out of production, buffering waterways, restoring wetlands,
179
and enhancing trout stream habitat.
This protection of water
quality would not have happened without the support of the Oneida
Nation Farm, which must agree to take the land out of production,
and the Oneida Land Commission, which must also approve the land
180
use and the reduction of leasable acreage. Unless there is a match
between the tribe’s culture and its institutions, tribal government
cannot develop strategic, long-term solutions to the tribe’s prob181
lems.
5.

Strategic Orientation

Tribal governments should identify long-term objectives, includ182
ing the steps and resources necessary to achieve them. The Navajo
Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA) developed a longrange plan for obtaining TAS status and to gain primacy for as many
183
environmental programs as possible. To obtain TAS status, NNEPA
focused on “developing comprehensive statutes and regulations, . . .
establishing inventories, acquiring information on program issues,
184
and obtaining training for staff.” In another example, the Oneida
Tribe showed its commitment to environmental protection by
providing critical funding from gaming revenue to pay for the
185
restoration of clear water and other natural resources.
178. Sokaogon Chippewa Community Water Quality Standards, § 151.11(1) (Jan.
26, 2005) available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/
tribes/chippewa_5_wqs.pdf.
179. Hill-Kelley, supra note 81, at 22.
180. Id. at 23.
181. CORNELL & KALT, supra note 158, at 9–10.
182. IAN W. RECORD, WE ARE THE STEWARDS: INDIGENOUS-LED FISHERIES INNOVATION
IN NORTH AMERICA 53 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs 2008), available at
http://jopna.net/pubs/JOPNA_2008_01_web.pdf. See also Marx et al, supra note 155,
at 380 (concluding that “the most significant impediment and constraint facing tribes
in twenty-first century will be obtaining the essential resources—financial and
technical —to carry out [environmental programs]”).
183. Jill Elise Grant, The Navajo Nation EPA’s Experience with “Treatment As A State”
and Primacy, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 9, 9–10 (2007). NNEPA believed that the
TAS provisions created a unique opportunity to assert tribal sovereignty and that EPA
implementation was not providing the desired degree of environmental protection.
Id.
184. Id. at 9.
185. See Hill-Kelley, supra note 81, at 22 (noting that, because the money could
have gone to health care, education, community infrastructure, or other essential
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As tribes consider taking responsibility for clean water on the
186
reservation, they must evaluate their internal infrastructure. Does
the tribe have an established environmental agency? Has the tribe
enacted a comprehensive water code? If so, does the tribe have the
ability to effectively enforce it? What happens if a tribal government187
owned business violates WQSs?
Where will financing and other
necessary resources come from? These are just some of the questions
that must be answered by tribes who wish to successfully regulate
clean water. Building infrastructure is not an easy task. However, for
many tribes the challenge may be worth the risks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Respect is not demonstrated by high-sounding proclamations that
risk nothing. The true test comes when one’s self interests are at
188
stake.
TAS status and establishment of tribal WQSs offer significant advantages to Native nations, but they are not without risks and may not
be the best solution for tribes seeking to assert sovereignty over
natural resources and clean water. The CWA initially omitted tribes,
but with the advent of the “self-determination” policy, the EPA was
authorized to treat tribes in the same manner as a state for purposes
of certain environmental regulation. However, tribes wishing to
exercise their sovereign right to regulate clean water must have a
functioning tribal government with authority and capacity to create
189
effective WQSs.
Once approval is gained, the TAS status brings with it many rewards including the ability to reduce “checkerboard” environmental
jurisdiction within reservations, strengthen government-to-

tribal government priorities, the planning, implementation, and evaluation of
environmental work was crucial to demonstrate that the money was used wisely).
186. See Tweedy, supra note 25, at 479 (stating that many tribes are precluded
from attaining TAS status because tribes lack resources to devote to lengthy
application process or because tribes cannot substantively meet standards).
187. See Treatment of Indian Tribes as States for Purposes of Sections 308, 309,
401, 402, and 405 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 58 Fed. Reg. 67,966, 67,971–72
(Dec. 22, 1993). “A common situation among Indian Tribes is that the Tribe is both
the regulator and regulatee. Such a situation could result in a conflict of interest if
the EPA authorized the Tribal program because the Tribe would be regulating itself.
The Agency believes that independence of the regulator and regulatee is necessary to
best assure effective and fair administration of these programs.” Id.
188. Grijalva, supra note 11, at 292.
189. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(a)(1), (2), (4) (2009).
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government relationships, influence federal environmental regulatory
policy and processes, and designate cultural, medicinal, and cere190
monial uses for water. These benefits must be balanced against the
risks of promulgating WQSs because tribal governments applying for
TAS status may be exposed to challenges that risk their sovereign
ability to protect their lands and natural resources. Tribes opting to
enact their own WQSs are often confronted with vague EPA support,
non-Indian jurisdictional challenges, and the ongoing threat of
changing federal law and policy.
Tribes who wish to successfully regulate clean water must critically evaluate their ability to do so. Tribal infrastructure must include
stable institutions and policies, a fair and effective dispute resolution
system, separation of politics from business management, a competent bureaucracy, cultural match or legitimacy, and strategic orientation. Tribal sovereignty is not just making the federal government live
up to its trust and treaty obligations. It is recognizing that, regardless
of stated policies of self-determination and government-togovernment relations, self-determination operationally falls to the
tribes who must assert sovereignty by performing the functions of
191
effective governments.
Despite a history of colonization and
assimilation, tribes can and are developing, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing their own environmental standards and playing a
critical role in the sustainability of these resources for the benefit of
Indians and non-Indians alike.

190.
191.

See supra Part IV.
JOSEPH P. KALT & JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INDIAN SELF-RULE 27 (The Harvard Project
on American Indian Economic Development 2004), available at http://jopna.net/
pubs/jopna_2004-03_Myths.pdf.
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